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Abstract
We construct a class of nonnegative martingale processes that oscillate
indefinitely with high probability. For these processes, we state a uniform
rate of the number of oscillations and show that this rate is asymptotically
close to the theoretical upper bound. These bounds on probability and
expectation of the number of upcrossings are compared to classical bounds
from the martingale literature. We discuss two applications. First, our
results imply that the limit of the minimum description length operator
may not exist. Second, we give bounds on how often one can change one’s
belief in a given hypothesis when observing a stream of data.1
Keywords. martingales, infinite oscillations, bounds, convergence
rates, minimum description length, mind changes.
1 Introduction
Martingale processes model fair gambles where knowledge of the past or choice
of betting strategy have no impact on future winnings. But their application
is not restricted to gambles and stock markets. Here we exploit the connection
between nonnegative martingales and probabilistic data streams, i.e., proba-
bility measures on infinite strings. For two probability measures P and Q on
infinite strings, the quotient Q/P is a nonnegative P -martingale. Conversely,
every nonnegative P -martingale is a multiple of Q/P P -almost everywhere for
some probability measure Q.
One of the famous results of martingale theory is
Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality [Doo53]. The inequality states that in ex-
pectation, every nonnegative martingale has only finitely many oscillations
(called upcrossings in the martingale literature). Moreover, the bound on the
expected number of oscillations is inversely proportional to their magnitude.
Closely related is Dubins’ Inequality [Dub62] which asserts that the probability
of having many oscillations decreases exponentially with their number. These
bounds are given with respect to oscillations of fixed magnitude.
In Section 4 we construct a class of nonnegative martingale processes that
have infinitely many oscillations of (by Doob necessarily) decreasing magnitude.
These martingales satisfy uniform lower bounds on the probability and the ex-
pectation of the number of upcrossings. We prove corresponding upper bounds
in Section 5 showing that these lower bounds are asymptotically tight. More-
over, the construction of the martingales is agnostic regarding the underlying
1 This is the extended technical report. The conference version can be found at [LH14].
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probability measure, assuming only mild restrictions on it. We compare these re-
sults to the statements of Dubins’ Inequality and Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality
and demonstrate that our process makes those inequalities asymptotically tight.
If we drop the uniformity requirement, asymptotics arbitrarily close to Doob
and Dubins’ bounds are achievable. We discuss two direct applications of these
bounds.
The Minimum Description Length (MDL) principle [Ris78] and the closely
related Minimal Message Length (MML) principle [WB68] recommend to select
among a class of models the one that has the shortest code length for the data
plus code length for the model. There are many variations, so the following
statements are generic: for a variety of problem classes MDL’s predictions have
been shown to converge asymptotically (predictive convergence). For continuous
independently identically distributed data the MDL estimator usually converges
to the true distribution [Gru¨07, Wal05] (inductive consistency). For arbitrary
(non-i.i.d.) countable classes, the MDL estimator’s predictions converge to those
of the true distribution for single-step predictions [PH05] and ∞-step predic-
tions [Hut09]. Inductive consistency implies predictive convergence, but not the
other way around. In Section 6 we show that indeed, the MDL estimator for
countable classes is inductively inconsistent. This can be a major obstacle for
using MDL for prediction, since the model used for prediction has to be changed
over and over again, incurring the corresponding computational cost.
Another application of martingales is in the theory of mind changes [LS05].
How likely is it that your belief in some hypothesis changes by at least α > 0
several times while observing some evidence? Davis recently showed [Dav13]
using elementary mathematics that this probability decreases exponentially. In
Section 7 we rephrase this problem in our setting: the stochastic process
P ( hypothesis | evidence up to time t )
is a martingale bounded between 0 and 1. The upper bound on the probability of
many changes can thus be derived from Dubins’ Inequality. This yields a simpler
alternative proof for Davis’ result. However, because we consider nonnegative
but unbounded martingales, we get a weaker bound than Davis.
2 Strings, Measures, and Martingales
We presuppose basic measure and probability theory [Dur10, Chp.1]. Let Σ be a
finite set, called alphabet. We assume Σ contains at least two distinct elements.
For every u ∈ Σ∗, the cylinder set
Γu := {uv | v ∈ Σ
ω}
is the set of all infinite strings of which u is a prefix. Furthermore, fix the
σ-algebras
Ft := σ
(
{Γu | u ∈ Σ
t}
)
and Fω := σ
( ∞⋃
t=1
Ft
)
.
(Ft)t∈N is a filtration: since Γu =
⋃
a∈Σ Γua, it follows that Ft ⊆ Ft+1 for every
t ∈ N, and all Ft ⊆ Fω by the definition of Fω. An event is a measurable set
E ∈ Fω. The event Ec := Σω \ E denotes the complement of E. See also the
list of notation in Appendix A.1.
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Definition 1 (Stochastic Process). (Xt)t∈N is called (R-valued) stochastic pro-
cess iff each Xt is an R-valued random variable.
Definition 2 (Martingale). Let P be a probability measure over (Σω,Fω).
An R-valued stochastic process (Xt)t∈N is called a P -supermartingale (P -sub-
martingale) iff
(a) each Xt is Ft-measurable, and
(b) E[Xt | Fs] ≤ Xs (E[Xt | Fs] ≥ Xs) almost surely for all s, t ∈ N with s < t.
A process that is both P -supermartingale and P -submartingale is called P -
martingale.
We call a supermartingale (submartingale) process (Xt)t∈N nonnegative iff
Xt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ N.
A stopping time is an (N ∪ {ω})-valued random variable T such that {v ∈
Σω | T (v) = t} ∈ Ft for all t ∈ N. Given a supermartingale (Xt)t∈N, the stopped
process (Xmin{t,T})t∈N is a supermartingale [Dur10, Thm. 5.2.6]. If (Xt)t∈N
is bounded, the limit of the stopped process, XT , exists almost surely even if
T = ω (Martingale Convergence Theorem [Dur10, Thm. 5.2.8]). We use the
following variant on Doob’s Optional Stopping Theorem for supermartingales.
Theorem 3 (Optional Stopping Theorem [Dur10, Thm. 5.7.6]). Let (Xt)t∈N
be a nonnegative supermartingale and let T be a stopping time. The random
variable XT is almost surely well defined and E[XT ] ≤ E[X0].
For two probability measures P and Q on (Σω,Fω), the measure Q is called
absolutely continuous with respect to P on cylinder sets iff Q(Γu) = 0 for all
u ∈ Σ∗ with P (Γu) = 0. We exploit the following two theorems that state the
connection between probability measures on infinite strings and martingales.
For two probability measures P and Q the quotient Q/P is a nonnegative P -
martingale if Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P on cylinder sets.
Conversely, for every nonnegative P -martingale there is a probability measure
Q on (Σω ,Fω) such that the martingale is P -almost surely a multiple of Q/P
and Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P on cylinder sets.
Theorem 4 (Measures → Martingales [Doo53, II§7 Ex. 3]). Let Q and P be
two probability measures on (Σω,Fω) such that Q is absolutely continuous with
respect to P on cylinder sets. Then the stochastic process (Xt)t∈N,
Xt(v) :=
Q(Γv1:t)
P (Γv1:t)
is a nonnegative P -martingale with E[Xt] = 1.
Theorem 5 (Martingales → Measures). Let P be a probability measure on
(Σω,Fω) and let (Xt)t∈N be a nonnegative P -martingale with E[Xt] = 1. There
is a probability measure Q on (Σω ,Fω) that is absolutely continuous with respect
to P on cylinder sets and for all v ∈ Σω and all t ∈ N with P (Γv1:t) > 0,
Xt(v) =
Q(Γv1:t)
P (Γv1:t)
.
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For completeness, we provide proofs for Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 in Ap-
pendix A.2.
Remark 17 (Absolute continuity and absolute continuity on cylinder sets).
A measure Q is called absolutely continuous with respect to P iff Q(A) = 0
implies P (A) = 0 for all measurable sets A ∈ Fω. Absolute continuity trivially
implies absolute continuity on cylinder sets. However, the converse is not true:
absolute continuity on cylinder sets is a strictly weaker condition than absolute
continuity.
Let P be a Bernoulli(2/3) and Q be a Bernoulli(1/3) process. Formally, we
fix Σ = {0, 1} and define for all u ∈ Σ∗,
P (Γu) :=
(
2
3
)ones(u) ( 1
3
)zeros(u)
,
Q(Γu) :=
(
1
3
)ones(u) ( 2
3
)zeros(u)
,
where ones(u) denotes the number of ones in u and zeros(u) denotes the number
of zeros in u. Both measures P and Q are nonzero on all cylinder sets: Q(Γu) ≥
3−|u| > 0 and P (Γu) ≥ 3−|u| > 0 for every u ∈ Σ∗. Therefore Q is absolutely
continuous with respect to P on cylinder sets. However, Q is not absolutely
continuous with respect to P : define
A :=
{
v ∈ Σω | lim sup
t→∞
1
t ones(v1:t) ≤
1
2
}
.
The set A is Fω-measurable since A =
⋂∞
n=1
⋃
u∈Un
Γu with Un := {u ∈ Σ
∗ |
|u| ≥ n and ones(u) ≤ |u|/2}, the set of all finite strings of length at least n that
have at least as many zeros as ones. We have that P (A) = 0 and Q(A) = 1,
hence Q is not absolutely continuous with respect to P .
While Theorem 4 trivially also holds if Q is absolutely continuous with re-
spect to P , Theorem 5 does not imply that Q is absolutely continuous with
respect to P . Consider the process X0(v) := 1,
Xt+1(v) :=
{
2Xt, if vt+1 = 0 and
1
2Xt, if vt+1 = 1.
The process (Xt)t∈N is a nonnegative P -martingale since every Xt is Ft-
measurable and for u = v1:t we have
E[Xt+1 | Ft](v) = P (Γu0 | Γu)2Xt(v) + P (Γu1 | Γu)
1
2Xt(v)
= 132Xt(v) +
2
3 ·
1
2Xt(v) = Xt(v).
Moreover,
Q(Γu) =
(
1
3
)ones(u) ( 2
3
)zeros(u)
=
(
2
3
)ones(u) ( 1
3
)zeros(u)
2−ones(u)2zeros(u) = P (Γu)Xt(v).
Hence Xt(v) = Q(Γv1:t)/P (Γv1:t) P -almost surely. The measure Q is uniquely
defined by its values on the cylinder sets, and as shown above,Q is not absolutely
continuous with respect to P .
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3 Martingale Upcrossings
Fix c ∈ R and ε > 0, and let (Xt)t∈N be a martingale over the probability space
(Σω,Fω, P ). Let t1 < t2. We say the process (Xt)t∈N does an ε-upcrossing
between t1 and t2 iff Xt1 ≤ c−ε and Xt2 ≥ c+ε. Similarly, we say (Xt)t∈N does
an ε-downcrossing between t1 and t2 iff Xt1 ≥ c + ε and Xt2 ≤ c − ε. Except
for the first upcrossing, consecutive upcrossings always involve intermediate
downcrossings. Formally, we define the stopping times
T0(v) := 0,
T2k+1(v) := inf{t > T2k(v) | Xt(v) ≤ c− ε}, and
T2k+2(v) := inf{t > T2k+1(v) | Xt(v) ≥ c+ ε}.
The T2k(v) denote the indexes of upcrossings. We count the number of upcross-
ings with the random variable UXt (c− ε, c+ ε), where
UXt (c− ε, c+ ε)(v) := sup{k ≥ 0 | T2k(v) ≤ t}
and UX(c − ε, c + ε) := supt∈N U
X
t (c − ε, c + ε) denotes the total number of
upcrossings. We omit the superscript X if the martingale (Xt)t∈N is clear from
context.
The following notation is used in the proofs. Given a monotone decreasing
function f : N → [0, 1) and m, k ∈ N, we define the event EX,fm,k that there are
at least k-many f(m)-upcrossings:
EX,fm,k :=
{
v ∈ Σω | UX(1− f(m), 1 + f(m))(v) ≥ k
}
.
For all m, k ∈ N we have EX,fm,k ⊇ E
X,f
m,k+1 and E
X,f
m,k ⊆ E
X,f
m+1,k. Again, we omit
X and f in the superscript if they are clear from context.
4 Indefinitely Oscillating Martingales
In this section we construct a class of martingales that has a high probability
of doing an infinite number of upcrossings. The magnitude of the upcrossings
decreases at a rate of a given summable function f (a function f is called
summable iff it has finite L1-norm, i.e.,
∑∞
i=1 f(i) < ∞), and the value of
the martingale Xt oscillates back and forth between 1− f(Mt) and 1 + f(Mt),
whereMt denotes the number of upcrossings so far. The process has a monotone
decreasing chance of escaping the oscillation. We need the following condition
on the probability measure P .
Definition 18 (Perpetual Entropy). A probability measure P has perpetual
entropy iff there is an ε > 0 such that for every u ∈ Σ∗ and v ∈ Σω with
P (Γu) > 0 there is an a ∈ Σ and a t ∈ N with 1− ε > P (Γuv1:ta | Γuv1:t) > ε.
This condition states that after seeing some string u ∈ Σ∗, there is always
some future time point where there are two symbols that both have conditional
probability greater than ε. In other words, observing data distributed according
to P , we almost surely never run out of symbols with significant entropy. This
is stronger than demanding that the observed string is nonconstant with high
probability, because we get a single lower bound ε for all observed strings u.
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Theorem 6 (An indefinitely oscillating martingale). Let 0 < δ < 1/2 and let
f : N→ [0, 1) be any monotone decreasing function such that
∑∞
i=1 f(i) ≤ δ/2.
For every probability measure P with perpetual entropy there is a nonnegative
martingale (Xt)t∈N with E[Xt] = 1 and
P [∀m. U(1− f(m), 1 + f(m)) ≥ m] ≥ 1− δ.
Proof. By grouping symbols from Σ into two groups, we can without loss of
generality assume that Σ = {0, 1}. Since P (Γu0 | Γu) + P (Γu1 | Γu) = 1, we
can define a function a : Σ∗ → Σ that assigns to every string u ∈ Σ∗ a symbol
au := a(u) such that pu := P (Γuau | Γu) ≤
1
2 . In Claim 7 we show that without
loss of generality, we can group such that pu > ε infinitely often for some ε > 0.
In the following we define the stochastic process (Xt)t∈N. This process de-
pends on the random variablesMt and γt, which are defined below. Let v ∈ Σω
and t ∈ N be given and define u := v1:t. For t = 0, we set X0(v) := 1, and if
pu = 0, we set Xt+1 = Xt. Otherwise we distinguish the following three cases.
(i) For Xt(v) ≥ 1:
Xt+1(v) :=
{
1− f(Mt(v)) if vt+1 6= au,
Xt(v) +
1−pu
pu
(Xt(v)− (1 − f(Mt(v)))) if vt+1 = au.
(ii) For 1 > Xt(v) ≥ γt(v):
Xt+1(v) :=
{
Xt(v)− γt(v) if vt+1 6= au,
1 + f(Mt(v)) if vt+1 = au.
(iii) For Xt(v) < γt(v) and Xt(v) < 1:
let dt(v) := min{
pu
1−pu
Xt(v),
1−pu
pu
γt(v)− 2f(Mt(v))};
Xt+1(v) :=
{
Xt(v) + dt(v) if vt+1 6= au,
Xt(v)−
1−pu
pu
dt(v) if vt+1 = au.
The random variables Mt and γt are defined as
γt(v) :=
pu
1−pu
(
1 + f(Mt(v)) −Xt(v)
)
Mt(v) := 1 + argmax
m∈N
{
∀k ≤ m. UXt (1− f(k), 1 + f(k)) ≥ k
}
,
i.e., Mt is 1 plus the number of upcrossings completed up to time t.
We give an intuition for the behavior of the process (Xt)t∈N. For all m, the
following repeats. First Xt increases while reading au’s until it reads one symbol
that is not au and then jumps down to 1 − f(m). Subsequently, Xt decreases
while not reading au’s until it falls below γt or reads an au and then jumps up
to 1 + f(m). If it falls below 1 and γt, then at every step, it can either jump
up to 1− f(m) or jump down to 0, whichever one is closest (the distance to the
closest of the two is given by dt). See Figure 1 for a visualization.
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tXt
1
1 + f(Mt)
1− f(Mt)
Figure 1: An example evaluation of the martingale defined in the proof of
Theorem 6.
For notational convenience, in the following we omit writing the argument
v to the random variables Xt, γt, Mt, and dt.
Claim 1: (Xt)t∈N is a martingale. Each Xt+1 is Ft+1-measurable, since it
uses only the first t+1 symbols of v. Writing out cases (i), (ii), and (iii), we get
E[Xt+1 | Ft]
(i)
= (1− f(Mt))(1 − pu) +
(
Xt +
1−pu
pu
(Xt − (1− f(Mt)))
)
pu = Xt,
E[Xt+1 | Ft]
(ii)
=
(
Xt −
pu
1−pu
((1 + f(Mt))−Xt)
)
(1− pu) + (1 + f(Mt))pu = Xt,
E[Xt+1 | Ft]
(iii)
= (Xt + dt)(1 − pu) + (Xt −
1−pu
pu
dt)pu = Xt.
Claim 2: If Xt ≥ 1− f(Mt) then Xt > γt. In this case
γt =
pu
1−pu
(1 + f(Mt)−Xt) ≤ 2
pu
1−pu
f(Mt),
and thus with pu ≤
1
2 and f(Mt) ≤
∑∞
k=1 f(k) ≤
δ
2 <
1
4 <
1
3 ,
Xt − γt ≥ 1− f(Mt)− 2
pu
1−pu
f(Mt) = 1−
1+pu
1−pu
f(Mt) ≥ 1− 3f(Mt) > 0.
Claim 3: If pu > 0, Xt < γt, and Xt < 1 then dt ≥ 0. We have
pu
1−pu
Xt ≥ 0
since pu > 0 and Xt ≥ 0. Moreover,
1−pu
pu
γt − 2f(Mt) = 1− f(Mt)−Xt > 0 by
the contrapositive of Claim 2.
Claim 4: The following holds for cases (i), (ii), and (iii).
(a) In case (i): Xt+1 ≥ Xt or Xt+1 = 1− f(Mt).
(b) In case (ii): Xt+1 ≤ Xt or Xt+1 = 1 + f(Mt).
(c) In case (iii): Xt < 1− f(Mt) and Xt+1 ≤ 1− f(Mt).
If pu = 0 then Xt+1 = Xt, so (a) and (b) hold trivially. Otherwise, for
(a) we have 1−pupu > 0 and Xt ≥ 1 − f(Mt). For (b) we have γt > 0 since
Xt < 1 + f(Mt). For (c), Xt < 1 − f(Mt) follows from the contrapositive of
Claim 2. If pu > 0 then by Claim 3 we have dt ≥ 0 and hence Xt+1 ≤ Xt+dt ≤
Xt + (1 + f(Mt)−Xt)− 2f(Mt) = 1− f(Mt).
Claim 5: Xt ≥ 0 and E[Xt] = 1. The latter follows from
E[Xt] = E[E[Xt | Ft−1]] = E[Xt−1] = . . . = E[X0] = 1.
Regarding the former, we use 0 ≤ f(Mt) < 1 to conclude
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(i6=) 1− f(Mt) ≥ 0,
(i=) 1−pupu (Xt − (1 − f(Mt))) ≥ 0 for Xt ≥ 1,
(ii 6=) Xt − γt ≥ 0 for Xt ≥ γt,
(ii=) 1 + f(Mt) ≥ 0,
(iii 6=) Xt + dt ≥ 0 since dt ≥ 0 by Claim 3, and
(iii=) Xt −
1−pu
pu
dt ≥ 0 since dt ≤
pu
1−pu
Xt.
Claim 6: Xt ≤ 1−f(Mt) or Xt ≥ 1+f(Mt) for all t ≥ T1. We use induction
on t: the induction start holds with XT1 ≤ 1 − f(Mt) and the induction step
follows from Claim 4.
Claim 7: P ({v ∈ Σω | pv1:t > ε for infinitely many t}) = 1 for some ε > 0.
By assumption P has perpetual entropy; let ε be as in Definition 18.
A := {v ∈ Σω | P (Γv1:t) > 0 for all t}
Its complement Ac =
⋃
u∈Σ∗:P (Γu)=0
Γu is the countable union of null sets and
therefore P (A) = 1. Let v ∈ A be some outcome, let t ∈ N be the current time
step, and define u := v1:t. Because P has perpetual entropy and P (Γu) > 0
since v ∈ A, there exists u′ ∈ Σ∗, a ∈ Σ, and v′ ∈ Σω such that v = uu′av′
and 1 − ε > P (Γuu′a | Γuu′) > ε. If P (Γuu′a | Γuu′) ≤ 1/2 we can select
auu′ := a; if P (Γuu′a | Γuu′) > 1/2 then, with abuse of notation, for the symbol
group b := Σ \ {a} we have ε < P (Γuu′b | Γuu′) ≤ 1/2 and hence we can select
auu′ := b. In either case puu′ > ε for a suitable grouping of symbols.
Claim 8: (Xt)t∈N converges almost surely to a random variable Xω ∈ {0, 1}.
According to the Martingale Convergence Theorem [Dur10, Thm. 5.2.8], the
process (Xt)t∈N converges almost surely to a random variable Xω. Assume that
Xω attains some value xω other than 0 and 1. Pick an ε
′ > 0 such that |xω | > 2ε′
and |1 − xω| > 2ε′. Since Xt → xω we have |xω −Xt| < ε′ for all but finitely
many t, and hence there is a t0 ∈ N such that |Xt| > ε
′ and |1 − Xt| > ε
′ for
all t ≥ t0. Recall that ε > 0 is fixed and depends only on P . Below we show
for cases (i), (ii), and (iii) that |Xt+1 − Xt| > min{ε · ε′, ε′,
1
8} if pu > ε. By
Claim 7 we almost surely have infinitely many t ≥ t0 with pu > ε, which is a
contradiction to the fact that (Xt)t∈N converges almost surely.
(i) Assume Xt ≥ 1, then Xt > 1 + ε
′ by assumption. Either Xt+1 = 1 −
f(Mt) ≤ 1 < Xt− ε′ or Xt+1 = Xt+
1−pu
pu
(Xt − 1+ f(Mt)) > Xt + (Xt −
1 + f(Mt)) ≥ Xt + (Xt − 1) > Xt + ε
′ because pu ≤
1
2 implies
1−pu
pu
≥ 1.
(ii) Assume γt ≤ Xt < 1, then ε′ < Xt < 1 − ε′. Either Xt+1 = 1 + f(Mt) ≥
1 > Xt + ε
′ or Xt+1 = Xt − γt and thus Xt − Xt+1 = γt =
pu
1−pu
(1 +
f(Mt)−Xt) > ε(1 + f(Mt)−Xt) ≥ ε(1−Xt) > εε′.
(iii) Assume Xt < γt and Xt < 1, then since 0 ≤ Xt by Claim 5, ε′ < Xt < γt
and Xt < 1 − ε′. Either dt =
pu
1−pu
Xt > εε
′ and we are done, or dt =
1−pu
pu
γt − 2f(Mt). If Xt ≥
5
8 then dt >
1−pu
pu
Xt − 2f(Mt) > Xt −
1
2 ≥
1
8 ,
since f(Mt) ≤
δ
2 <
1
4 . If Xt <
5
8 then dt = 1− f(Mt)−Xt >
3
4 −Xt >
1
8 .
Hence either Xt+1−Xt = dt > min{εε′,
1
8} or Xt−Xt+1 =
1−pu
pu
dt > dt >
min{εε′, 18}.
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Claim 9: For all m ∈ N, if Em,m−1 6= ∅ then P (Em,m | Em,m−1) ≥ 1 −
2f(m). Let v ∈ Em,m−1 and let t0 ∈ N be a time step such that exactly
m − 1 upcrossings have been completed up to time t0, i.e., Mt0(v) = m. The
subsequent downcrossing is completed eventually with probability 1: we are
in case (i) and in every step there is a chance of 1 − pu ≥
1
2 of completing
the downcrossing. Therefore we assume without loss of generality that the
downcrossing has been completed, i.e., that t0 is such that Xt0(v) = 1 − f(m).
We will bound the probability p := P (Em,m | Em,m−1) that Xt rises above
1 + f(m) after t0 to complete the m-th upcrossing.
Define the stopping time T : Σω → N ∪ {ω},
T (v) := inf{t ≥ t0 | Xt(v) ≥ 1 + f(m) ∨ Xt(v) = 0},
and define the stochastic process Yt = 1 + f(m) − Xmin{t0+t,T}. Because
(Xmin{t0+t,T})t∈N is martingale, (Yt)t∈N is martingale. By definition, Xt al-
ways stops at 1 + f(m) before exceeding it, thus XT ≤ 1 + f(m), and hence
(Yt)t∈N is nonnegative. The Optional Stopping Theorem yields E[YT−t0 | Ft0 ] ≤
E[Y0 | Ft0 ] and thus E[XT | Ft0 ] ≥ E[Xt0 | Ft0 ] = 1 − f(m). We show that
XT ∈ {0, 1 + f(m)} almost surely. If T is finite then this holds by definition of
T . If T = ω then the random variable XT is defined as the limit limt→∞Xt. By
Claim 8 the limit XT ∈ {0, 1} and according to Claim 6 we have Xt ≤ 1−f(Mt)
for all t ∈ N, so Xt cannot converge to 1. We conclude that
1− f(m) ≤ E[XT | Ft0 ] = (1 + f(m)) · p+ 0 · (1− p),
hence P (Em,m | Em,m−1) = p ≥ 1− f(m)(1 + p) ≥ 1− 2f(m).
Claim 10: Em+1,m = Em,m and Em+1,m+1 ⊆ Em,m. By definition of Mt,
the i-th upcrossings of the process (Xt)t∈N is between 1−f(i) and 1+f(i). The
function f is monotone decreasing, and by Claim 6 the process (Xt)t∈N does not
assume values between 1 − f(i) and 1 + f(i). Therefore the first m f(m + 1)-
upcrossings are also f(m)-upcrossings, i.e., Em+1,m ⊆ Em,m. By definition of
Em,k we have Em+1,m ⊇ Em,m and Em+1,m+1 ⊆ Em+1,m.
Claim 11: P (Em,m) ≥ 1−
∑m
i=1 2f(i). For P (E0,0) = 1 this holds trivially.
Using Claim 9 and Claim 10 we conclude inductively
P (Em,m) = P (Em,m ∩ Em,m−1) = P (Em,m | Em,m−1)P (Em,m−1)
= P (Em,m | Em,m−1)P (Em−1,m−1)
≥ (1− 2f(m))
(
1−
m−1∑
i=1
2f(i)
)
≥ 1−
m∑
i=1
2f(i).
From Claim 10 follows
⋂m
i=1 Ei,i = Em,m and therefore P (
⋂∞
i=1Ei,i) =
limm→∞ P (Em,m) ≥ 1−
∑∞
i=1 2f(i) ≥ 1− δ.
Theorem 6 gives a uniform lower bound on the probability for many up-
crossings: it states the probability of the event that for all m ∈ N, U(1 −
f(m), 1 + f(m)) ≥ m holds. This is a lot stronger than the nonuniform bound
P [U(1 − f(m), 1 + f(m)) ≥ m] ≥ 1 − δ for all m ∈ N: the quantifier is inside
the probability statement.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 6, we get the following uniform
lower bound on the expected number of upcrossings.
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Corollary 7 (Expected Upcrossings). Let 0 < δ < 1/2 and let f : N → [0, 1)
be any monotone decreasing function such that
∑∞
i=1 f(i) ≤ δ/2. For every
probability measure P with perpetual entropy there is a nonnegative martingale
(Xt)t∈N with E[Xt] = 1 and for all m ∈ N,
E[U(1− f(m), 1 + f(m))] ≥ m(1− δ).
Proof. From Theorem 6 and Markov’s inequality.
By choosing a specific slowly decreasing but summable function f , we get
the following concrete results.
Corollary 8 (Concrete lower bound). Let 0 < δ < 1/2. For every probability
measure P with perpetual entropy there is a nonnegative martingale (Xt)t∈N
with E[Xt] = 1 such that
P
[
∀ε > 0. U(1− ε, 1 + ε) ∈ Ω
(
δ
ε(ln 1ε )
2
)]
≥ 1− δ and
E[U(1− ε, 1 + ε)] ∈ Ω
(
1
ε(ln 1ε )
2
)
.
Moreover, for all ε < 0.015 we get E[U(1− ε, 1 + ε)] > δ(1−δ)
ε(ln 1ε )
2 and
P
[
∀ε < 0.015. U(1− ε, 1 + ε) > δ
ε(ln 1ε )
2
]
≥ 1− δ.
Proof. Define
g : (0, e−2]→ [0,∞), ε 7→ 2δ
(
1
ε(ln ε)2
−
e2
4
)
.
We have g(e−2) = 0, limε→0 g(ε) =∞, and
dg
dε
(ε) = 2δ
(
−1
ε2(ln ε)2
+
−2
ε2(ln ε)3
)
= −
2δ(2 + ln ε)
ε2(ln ε)3
< 0 on (0, e−2).
Therefore the function g is strictly monotone decreasing and hence invertible.
Choose f := g−1. Using the substitution t = g(ε), dt = dgdε (ε)dε,
∞∑
t=1
f(t) ≤
∫ ∞
0
f(t)dt =
∫ g−1(∞)
g−1(0)
f(g(ε))
dg
dε
(ε)dε
= 2δ
(∫ 0
e−2
−1
ε(ln ε)2
dε+
∫ 0
e−2
−2
ε(ln ε)3
dε
)
= 2δ
([
1
ln ε
]0
e−2
+
[
1
(ln ε)2
]0
e−2
)
= 2δ
(
1
2 −
1
4
)
= δ2 .
Now we apply Theorem 6 and Corollary 7 to m := g(ε) and get
P
[
U(1− ε, 1 + ε) ≥ 2δ
(
1
ε(ln ε)2 −
e2
4
)]
≥ 1− δ, and
E[U(1− ε, 1 + ε)] ≥ 2δ(1− δ)
(
1
ε(ln ε)2 −
e2
4
)
.
For ε < 0.015, we have 1
ε(ln ε)2
> e
2
2 , hence g(ε) >
δ
ε(ln ε)2 .
The concrete bounds given in Corollary 8 are not the asymptotically opti-
mal ones: there are summable functions that decrease even more slowly. For
example, we could multiply the function g with the factor
√
ln(1/ε) (which still
is not optimal).
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5 Martingale Upper Bounds
In this section we state upper bounds on the probability and expectations of
many upcrossings (Dubins’ Inequality and Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality). We
use the construction from the previous section to show that these bounds are
asymptotically tight. Moreover, with the following theorem we show that the
uniform lower bound on the probability of many upcrossings guaranteed in
Theorem 6 is also asymptotically tight.
Every function f is either summable or not. If f is summable, then we
can scale it with a constant factor such that its sum is smaller than δ2 , and
then apply the construction of Theorem 6. If f is not summable, the following
theorem implies that there is no uniform lower bound on the probability of
having at least m-many f(m)-upcrossings.
Theorem 9 (Upper bound on upcrossing rate). Let f : N→ [0, 1) be a mono-
tone decreasing function such that
∑∞
t=1 f(t) = ∞. For every probability mea-
sure P and for every nonnegative P -martingale (Xt)t∈N with E[Xt] = 1,
P [∀m. U(1− f(m), 1 + f(m)) ≥ m] = 0.
Proof. Define the events Dm :=
⋃m
i=1 E
c
i,i = {∀i ≤ m. U(1−f(i), 1+f(i)) ≥ i}.
Then Dm ⊆ Dm+1. Assume there is a constant c > 0 such that c ≤ P (Dcm) =
P (
⋂m
i=1 Ei,i) for all m. Let m ∈ N, v ∈ D
c
m, and pick t0 ∈ N such that the
process X0(v), . . . , Xt0(v) has completed i-many f(i)-upcrossings for all i ≤ m
and Xt0(v) ≤ 1 − f(m + 1). If Xt(v) ≥ 1 + f(m + 1) for some t ≥ t0, the
(m+1)-st upcrossing for f(m+1) is completed and thus v ∈ Em+1,m+1. Define
the stopping time T : Σω → (N ∪ {ω}),
T (v) := inf{t ≥ t0 | Xt(v) ≥ 1 + f(m+ 1)}.
According to the Optional Stopping Theorem applied to the process (Xt)t≥t0 ,
the random variable XT is almost surely well-defined and E[XT | Ft0 ] ≤ E[Xt0 |
Ft0 ] = Xt0 . This yields 1 − f(m + 1) ≥ Xt0 ≥ E[XT | Ft0 ] and by taking the
expectation E[ · | Xt0 ≤ 1− f(m+ 1)] on both sides,
1− f(m+ 1) ≥ E[XT | Xt0 ≤ 1− f(m+ 1)]
≥ (1 + f(m+ 1))P [XT ≥ 1 + f(m+ 1) | Xt0 ≤ 1− f(m+ 1)]
by Markov’s inequality. Therefore
P (Em+1,m+1 | D
c
m) = P [XT ≥ 1 + f(m+ 1) | Xt0 ≤ 1− f(m+ 1)]
· P [Xt0 ≤ 1− f(m+ 1) | D
c
m]
≤ P [XT ≥ 1 + f(m+ 1) | Xt0 ≤ 1− f(m+ 1)]
≤ 1−f(m+1)1+f(m+1) ≤ 1− f(m+ 1).
Together with c ≤ P (Dcm) we get
P (Dm+1 \Dm) = P
(
Ecm+1,m+1 ∩D
c
m
)
= P
(
Ecm+1,m+1 | D
c
m
)
P (Dcm) ≥ f(m+ 1)c.
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This is a contradiction because
∑∞
i=1 f(i) =∞:
1 ≥ P (Dm+1) = P
(
m⊎
i=1
(Di+1 \Di)
)
=
m∑
i=1
P (Di+1 \Di) ≥
m∑
i=1
f(i+1)c→∞.
Therefore the assumption P (Dcm) ≥ c for all m is false, and hence we get
P [∀m. U(1− f(m), 1+ f(m)) ≥ m] = P (
⋂∞
i=1 Ei,i) = limm→∞ P (D
c
m) = 0.
By choosing a specific decreasing non-summable function f for Theorem 9,
we get that U(1− ε, 1 + ε) /∈ Ω( 1ε log(1/ε) ) P -almost surely.
Corollary 10 (Concrete upper bound). Let P be a probability measure and let
(Xt)t∈N be a nonnegative martingale with E[Xt] = 1. Then for all a, b > 0,
P
[
∀ε > 0. U(1− ε, 1 + ε) ≥ aε log(1/ε) − b
]
= 0.
Proof. We proceed analogously to the proof of Corollary 7. Define
g : (0, c]→ [g(c),∞), ε 7→
a
ε ln 1ε
− b
with c < 1 and g(c) ≥ 1. We have limε→0 g(ε)→∞ and
dg
dε
(ε) =
−a
ε2 ln 1ε
+
−a
ε2(ln 1ε )
2
< 0 on (0, c].
Therefore the function g is strictly monotone decreasing and hence invertible.
Choose f := g−1. Using the substitution t = g(ε), dt = dgdε (ε)dε,
∞∑
t=1
f(t) ≥
∫ ∞
g(c)
f(t)dt =
∫ g−1(∞)
c
f(g(ε))
dg
dε
(ε)dε
=
∫ 0
c
−a
ε ln 1ε
dε+
∫ 0
c
−a
ε(ln 1ε )
2
dε =
∫ − ln 0
− ln c
a
u
du +
∫ 0
c
−a
ε(ln 1ε )
2
dε
= [a lnu]
+∞
− ln c +
[
a
ln 1
ε
]0
c
=∞− a ln(− ln c) + 0− a
ln 1
c
=∞.
Now we apply Theorem 9 to m := g(ε).
Theorem 11 (Dubins’ Inequality [Dub62, Thm. 13.1]). For every nonnegative
P -martingale (Xt)t∈N and for every c > 0 and every ε > 0,
P [U(c− ε, c+ ε) ≥ k] ≤
(
c−ε
c+ε
)k
E
[
min
{
X0
c−ε , 1
}]
.
Dubins’ Inequality immediately yields the following bound on the probability
of the number of upcrossings.
P [U(1− f(m), 1 + f(m)) ≥ k] ≤
(
1−f(m)
1+f(m)
)k
.
The construction from Theorem 6 shows that this bound is asymptotically tight
for m = k → ∞ and δ → 0: define the monotone decreasing function f : N →
[0, 1),
f(t) :=
{
δ
2m , if t ≤ m, and
0, otherwise.
(1)
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Then the martingale from Theorem 6 yields the lower bound
P [U(1− δ2k , 1 +
δ
2k ) ≥ k] ≥ 1− δ,
while Dubins’ Inequality gives the upper bound
P [U(1− δ2k , 1 +
δ
2k ) ≥ k] ≤
(
1− δ2k
1 + δ2k
)k
=
(
1−
2δ
2k + δ
)k
k→∞
−−−−→ exp(−δ).
As δ approaches 0, the value of exp(−δ) approaches 1− δ (but exceeds it since
exp is convex). For δ = 0.2 and m = k = 3, the difference between the two
bounds is already lower than 0.021.
The following theorem places an upper bound on the rate of expected up-
crossings. In Appendix A.3 we discuss different versions of this inequality and
prove this inequality tight.
Theorem 12 (Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality [Xu12]). Let (Xt)t∈N be a sub-
martingale. For every c ∈ R and ε > 0,
E[Ut(c− ε, c+ ε)] ≤
1
2εE[max{c− ε−Xt, 0}].
Asymptotically, Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality states that with ε→ 0,
E[U(1− ε, 1 + ε)] ∈ O
(
1
ε
)
.
Again, we can use the construction of Theorem 6 to show that these asymptotics
are tight: Let f be as in (1). Then for δ = 12 , Corollary 7 yields a martingale
fulfilling the lower bound
E[U(1 − 14m , 1 +
1
4m )] ≥
m
2
and Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality gives the upper bound
E[U(1− 14m , 1 +
1
4m )] ≤ 2m,
which differs by a factor of 4. In Theorem 23 we show that
Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality can also be made exactly tight.
The lower bound for the expected number of upcrossings given in Corollary 7
is a little looser than the upper bound given in Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality.
Closing this gap remains an open problem. We know by Theorem 9 that given
a non-summable function f , the uniform probability for many f(m)-upcrossings
goes to 0. However, this does not necessarily imply that expectation also tends
to 0; low probability might be compensated for by high value. So for expectation
there might be a lower bound larger than Corollary 7, an upper bound smaller
than Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality, or both.
If we drop the requirement that the rate of upcrossings be uniform,
Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality is the best upper bound we can give: using the
little-o notation, assume there is a smaller upper bound g(m) ∈ o(m) such that
for every martingale process (Xt)t∈N,
E
[
U(1− 1m , 1 +
1
m )
]
∈ o(g(m)). (2)
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In the following we sketch how to construct a martingale that violates this
bound. Define f(m) := g(m)/m, then f(m) → 0 as m → ∞, so there is an
infinite sequence (mi)i∈N such that
∑∞
i=0 f(mi) ≤ 1. We define the martin-
gale process (Xt)t∈N such that it picks an i ∈ N with probability f(mi), and
then becomes a martingale that makes Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality tight for
upcrossings between 1− 1/mi and 1+1/mi: for every i, we apply the construc-
tion of Theorem 23. This would give the following lower bound on the expected
number of upcrossings for each i:
∀i E
[
U(1− 1mi ), 1 +
1
mi
)
]
≥ mif(mi) = g(mi).
Since there are infinitely manymi, we get a contradiction to (2). Using a similar
argument, we can show that nonuniformly, Dubins’ bound is also the best we
can get.
6 Application to the MDL Principle
Let M be a countable set of probability measures on (Σω ,Fω), called environ-
ment class. Let K : M → [0, 1] be a function such that
∑
Q∈M 2
−K(Q) ≤ 1,
called complexity function on M. Following notation in [Hut09], we define for
u ∈ Σ∗ the minimal description length model as
MDLu := argmin
Q∈M
{
− logQ(Γu) +K(Q)
}
.
That is, − logQ(Γu) is the (arithmetic) code length of u given model Q, and
K(Q) is a complexity penalty for Q, also called regularizer. Given data u ∈ Σ∗,
MDLu is the measure Q ∈M that minimizes the total code length of data and
model.
The following corollary of Theorem 6 states that in some cases the limit
limt→∞MDL
v1:t does not exist with high probability.
Corollary 13 (MDL may not converge). Let P be a probability measure on
the measurable space (Σω ,Fω) with perpetual entropy. For any 0 < δ < 1/2,
there is a set of probability measures M containing P , a complexity function
K :M→ [0, 1], and a measurable set Z ∈ Fω with P (Z) ≥ 1 − δ such that for
all v ∈ Z, the limit limt→∞MDL
v1:t does not exist.
Proof. Fix some positive monotone decreasing summable function f (e.g., the
one given in Corollary 8). Let (Xt)t∈N be the P -martingale process from
Theorem 6. By Theorem 5 there is a probability measure Q on (Σω,Fω) such
that
Xt(v) =
Q(Γv1:t)
P (Γv1:t)
P -almost surely. Choose M := {P,Q} with K(P ) := K(Q) := 1. From the
definition of MDL and Q it follows that
Xt(u) < 1 ⇐⇒ Q(Γu) < P (Γu) =⇒ MDL
u = P, and
Xt(u) > 1 ⇐⇒ Q(Γu) > P (Γu) =⇒ MDL
u = Q.
For Z :=
⋂∞
m=1E
X,f
m,m Theorem 6 yields
P (Z) = P [∀m. U(1− f(m), 1 + f(m)) ≥ m] ≥ 1− δ.
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For each v ∈ Z, the measure MDLv1:t alternates between P and Q indefinitely,
and thus its limit does not exist.
Crucial to the proof of Corollary 13 is that not only does the process Q/P
oscillate indefinitely, it oscillates around the constant exp(K(Q) −K(P )) = 1.
This implies that the MDL estimator may keep changing indefinitely, and thus
it is inductively inconsistent.
7 Bounds on Mind Changes
Suppose we are testing a hypothesis H ⊆ Σω on a stream of data v ∈ Σω. Let
P (H | Γv1:t) denote our belief in H at time t ∈ N after seeing the evidence v1:t.
By Bayes’ rule,
P (H | Γv1:t) = P (H)
P (Γv1:t | H)
P (Γv1:t)
=: Xt(v).
Since Xt is a constant multiple of P ( · | H)/P and P ( · | H) is a probability
measure on (Σω,Fω) that is absolutely continuous with respect to P on cylinder
sets, the process (Xt)t∈N is a P -martingale with respect to the filtration (Ft)t∈N
by Theorem 4. By definition, (Xt)t∈N is bounded between 0 and 1.
Let α > 0. We are interested in the question how likely it is to often
change one’s mind about H by at least α, i.e., what is the probability for
Xt = P (H | Γv1:t) to decrease and subsequently increase m times by at least α.
Formally, we define the stopping times T ′0,ν(v) := 0,
T ′2k+1,ν(v) := inf{t > T
′
2k,ν(v) | Xt(v) ≤ XT ′2k,ν(v)(v)− να},
T ′2k+2,ν(v) := inf{t > T
′
2k+1,ν(v) | Xt(v) ≥ XT ′2k+1,ν(v)(v) + να},
and T ′k := min{T
′
k,ν | ν ∈ {−1,+1}}. (In Davis’ notation, XT ′0,ν , XT ′1,ν , . . . is
an α-alternating W-sequence for ν = 1 and an α-alternating M-sequence for
ν = −1 [Dav13, Def. 4].) For any t ∈ N, the random variable
AXt (α)(v) := sup{k ≥ 0 | T
′
k(v) ≤ t},
is defined as the number of α-alternations up to time t. Let AX(α) :=
supt∈NA
X
t (α) denote the total number of α-alternations.
Setting α = 2ε, the α-alternations differ from ε-upcrossings in three ways:
first, for upcrossings, the process decreases below c − ε, then increases above
c + ε, and then repeats. For alternations, the process may overshoot c − ε or
c+ ε and thus change the bar for the subsequent alternations, causing a ‘drift’
in the target bars over time. Second, for α-alternations the initial value of the
martingale is relevant. Third, one upcrossing corresponds to two alternations,
since one upcrossing always involves a preceding downcrossing. See Figure 2.
To apply our bounds for upcrossings on α-alternations, we use the following
lemma by Davis. We reinterpret it as stating that every bounded martingale
process (Xt)t∈N can be modified into a martingale (Yt)t∈N such that the proba-
bility for many α-alternations is not decreased and the number of alternations
equals the number of upcrossings plus the number of downcrossings. A sketch
of the proof can be found in Appendix A.4.
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tXt
c
c+ α2
c− α2
Figure 2: This example process has two upcrossings between c−α/2 and c+α/2
(completed at the time steps of the vertical orange bars) and four α-alternations
(completed when crossing the horizontal blue bars).
Lemma 14 (Upcrossings and alternations [Dav13, Lem. 9]). Let (Xt)t∈N be a
martingale with 0 ≤ Xt ≤ 1. There exists a martingale (Yt)t∈N with 0 ≤ Yt ≤ 1
and a constant c ∈ (α/2, 1− α/2) such that for all t ∈ N and for all k ∈ N,
P [AXt (α) ≥ 2k] ≤ P [A
Y
t (α) ≥ 2k] = P [U
Y
t (c− α/2, c+ α/2) ≥ k].
Theorem 15 (Upper bound on alternations). For every martingale process
(Xt)t∈N with 0 ≤ Xt ≤ 1,
P [A(α) ≥ 2k] ≤
(
1− α
1 + α
)k
.
Proof. We apply Lemma 14 to (Xt)t∈N and (1 − Xt)t∈N to get the processes
(Yt)t∈N and (Zt)t∈N. Dubins’ Inequality yields
P [AXt (α) ≥ 2k] ≤ P [U
Y
t (c+ −
α
2 , c+ −
α
2 ) ≥ k] ≤
(
c+ −
α
2
c+ +
α
2
)k
=: g(c+) and
P [A1−Xt (α) ≥ 2k] ≤ P [U
Z
t (c− −
α
2 , c− −
α
2 ) ≥ k] ≤
(
c− −
α
2
c− +
α
2
)k
= g(c−)
for some c+, c− ∈ (α/2, 1− α/2). Because Lemma 14 is symmetric for (Xt)t∈N
and (1−Xt)t∈N, we have c+ = 1−c−. Since P [AXt (α) ≥ 2k] = P [A
1−X
t (α) ≥ 2k]
by the definition of AXt (α), we have that both are less than min{g(c+), g(c−)} =
min{g(c+), g(1−c+)}. This is maximized for c+ = c− = 1/2 because g is strictly
monotone increasing for c > α/2. Therefore
P [AXt (α) ≥ 2k] ≤
( 1
2 −
α
2
1
2 +
α
2
)k
=
(
1− α
1 + α
)k
.
Since this bound is independent of t, it also holds for P [AX(α) ≥ 2k].
The bound of Theorem 15 is the square root of the bound derived by
Davis [Dav13, Thm. 10 & Thm. 11].
P [A(α) ≥ 2k] ≤
(
1− α
1 + α
)2k
(3)
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This bound is tight [Dav13, Cor. 13]. A similar bound for upcrossings was
proved by Dubins [Dub72, Cor. 1].
Because 0 ≤ Xt ≤ 1, the process (1 −Xt)t∈N is also a nonnegative martin-
gale, hence the same upper bounds apply to it. This explains why the result
in Theorem 15 is worse than Davis’ bound (3): Dubins’ bound applies to all
nonnegative martingales, while Davis’ bound uses the fact that the process is
bounded from below and above. For unbounded nonnegative martingales, down-
crossings are ‘free’ in the sense that one can make a downcrossing almost surely
successful (as done in the proof of Theorem 6). If we apply Dubins’ bound to
the process (1−Xt)t∈N, we get the same probability bound for the downcross-
ings of (Xt)t∈N (which are upcrossings of (1−Xt)t∈N). Multiplying both bounds
yields Davis’ bound (3); however, we still require a formal argument why the
upcrossing and downcrossing bounds are independent.
The following corollary to Theorem 15 derives an upper bound on the ex-
pected number of α-alternations.
Theorem 16 (Upper bound on expected alternations). For every martingale
(Xt)t∈N with 0 ≤ Xt ≤ 1, the expectation E[A(α)] ≤
1
α .
Proof. By Theorem 15 we have P [A(α) ≥ 2k] ≤
(
1−α
1+α
)k
, and thus
E[A(α)] =
∞∑
k=1
P [A(α) ≥ k]
= P [A(α) ≥ 1] +
∞∑
k=1
(
P [A(α) ≥ 2k] + P [A(α) ≥ 2k + 1]
)
≤ 1 +
∞∑
k=1
2P [A(α) ≥ 2k] ≤ 1 + 2
∞∑
k=1
(
1− α
1 + α
)k
=
1
α
.
We now apply the technical results of this section to the martingale process
Xt = P ( · | H)/P , our belief in the hypothesis H as we observe data. The
probability of changing our mind k times by at least α decreases exponentially
with k (Theorem 15). Furthermore, the expected number of times we change
our mind by at least α is bounded by 1/α (Theorem 16). In other words, having
to change one’s mind a lot often is unlikely.
Because in this section we consider martingales that are bounded between
0 and 1, the lower bounds from Section 4 do not apply here. While for the
martingales constructed in Theorem 6, the number of 2α-alternations and the
number of α-up- and downcrossings coincide, these processes are not bounded.
However, we can give a similar construction that is bounded between 0 and 1
and makes Davis’ bound asymptotically tight.
8 Conclusion
We constructed an indefinitely oscillating martingale process from a summable
function f . Theorem 6 and Corollary 7 give uniform lower bounds on the
probability and expectation of the number of upcrossings of decreasing mag-
nitude. In Theorem 9 we proved the corresponding upper bound if the func-
tion f is not summable. In comparison, Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality and
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Dubins’ Inequality give upper bounds that are not uniform. In Section 5 we
showed that for a certain summable function f , our martingales make these
bounds asymptotically tight as well.
Our investigation of indefinitely oscillating martingales was motivated by two
applications. First, in Corollary 13 we showed that the minimum description
length operator may not exist in the limit: for any probability measure P we
can construct a probability measure Q such that Q/P oscillates forever around
the specific constant that causes limt→∞MDL
v1:t to not converge.
Second, we derived bounds for the probability of changing one’s mind about
a hypothesis H when observing a stream of data v ∈ Σω. The probability
P (H | Γv1:t) is a martingale and in Theorem 15 we proved that the probability
of changing the belief in H often by at least α decreases exponentially.
A question that remains open is whether there is a uniform upper bound on
the expected number of upcrossings tighter than Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality.
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A Appendix
A.1 Notation
• := denotes a definition.
• Ac := Σω \A denotes the complement of a measurable set A ⊆ Σω.
• ⊎ denotes disjoint union.
• For a set X , the power set of X is denoted by 2X .
• 1X is the characteristic function for a set X , i.e., 1X(x) = 1 if x ∈ X and
0 otherwise.
• ω is the smallest infinite ordinal.
• N is the set of natural numbers.
• R is the set of real numbers.
• For a, b ∈ R, [a, b] denotes the closed interval with end points a and b; (a, b]
and [a, b) denote half-open intervals and (a, b) denotes an open interval.
• The set Σ denotes a finite alphabet. The set of all finite strings of length
n is denoted Σn, the set of all finite strings is denoted Σ∗, and the set of
all infinite strings is denoted Σω.
• For a string u ∈ Σ∗, |u| denotes the length of u.
• For v ∈ Σω, v1:k denotes the first k characters of v.
• f ∈ Ω(g) denotes g ∈ O(f), i.e., ∃k > 0 ∃x0 ∀x ≥ x0. g(x) · k ≤ f(x).
• f ∈ o(g) denotes limx→∞
f(x)
g(x) = 0.
A.2 Measures and Martingales
In this section we prove Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, establishing the connecting
between measures on infinite strings and martingales.
Proof of Theorem 4. Xt is only undefined if P (Γv1:t) = 0. The set
{v ∈ Σω | ∃t. P (Γv1:t) = 0}
has P -measure 0 and hence (Xt)t∈N is well-defined almost everywhere.
Xt is constant on Γu for all u ∈ Σt, and Ft is generated by a collection of
finitely many disjoint sets:
Σω =
⊎
u∈Σt
Γu.
(a) Therefore Xt is Ft-measurable.
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(b) Γu =
⊎
a∈Σ Γua for all u ∈ Σ
t and v ∈ Γu, and therefore
E[Xt+1 | Ft](v) =
1
P (Γu)
∑
a∈Σ
Xt+1(ua)P (Γua) =
1
P (Γu)
∑
a∈Σ
Q(Γua)
P (Γua)
P (Γua)
(∗)
=
1
P (Γu)
∑
a∈Σ
Q(Γua) =
Q(Γu)
P (Γu)
= Xt(v).
At (∗) we used the fact that Q is absolutely continuous with respect to
P on cylinder sets. (If Q were not absolutely continuous with respect to
P on cylinder sets there are cases where P (Γu) > 0, P (Γua) = 0, and
Q(Γua) 6= 0. Therefore Xt+1(ua) does not contribute to the expectation
and thus Xt+1(ua)P (Γua) = 0 6= Q(Γua).)
P ≥ 0 and Q ≥ 0 by definition, thus Xt ≥ 0. Since P (Γǫ) = Q(Γǫ) = 1, we have
E[X0] = 1.
The following lemma gives a convenient condition for the existence of a
measure on (Σω,Fω). It is a special case of the Daniell-Kolmogorov Extension
Theorem [RW94, Thm. 26.1].
Lemma 19 (Extending measures). Let q : Σ∗ → [0, 1] be a function such that
q(ǫ) = 1 and
∑
a∈Σ q(ua) = q(u) for all u ∈ Σ
∗. Then there exists a unique
probability measure Q on (Σω,Fω) such that q(u) = Q(Γu) for all u ∈ Σ∗.
To prove this lemma, we need the following two ingredients.
Definition 20 (Semiring). A set R ⊆ 2Ω is called semiring over Ω iff
(a) ∅ ∈ R,
(b) for all A,B ∈ R, the set A ∩B ∈ R, and
(c) for all A,B ∈ R, there are pairwise disjoint sets C1, . . . , Cn ∈ R such that
A \B =
⊎n
i=1 Ci.
Theorem 21 (Carathe´odory’s Extension Theorem [Dur10, Thm. A.1.1]). Let
R be a semiring over Ω and let µ : R→ [0, 1] be a function such that
(a) µ(Ω) = 1 (normalization),
(b) µ(
⊎n
i=1 Ai) =
∑n
i=1 µ(Ai) for pairwise disjoint sets A1, . . . , An ∈ R such
that
⊎n
i=1Ai ∈ R (finite additivity), and
(c) µ(
⋃
i≥0 Ai) ≤
∑
i≥0 µ(Ai) for any collection (Ai)i≥0 such that each Ai ∈ R
and
⋃
i≥0 Ai ∈ R (σ-subadditivity).
Then there is a unique extension µ of µ that is a probability measure on
(Ω, σ(R)) such that µ(A) = µ(A) for all A ∈ R.
Proof of Lemma 19. We show the existence of Q using
Carathe´odory’s Extension Theorem. Define R := {Γu | u ∈ Σ∗} ∪ {∅}.
(a) ∅ ∈ R.
(b) For any Γu,Γv ∈ R, either
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• u is a prefix of v and Γu ∩ Γv = Γv ∈ R, or
• v is a prefix of u and Γu ∩ Γv = Γu ∈ R, or
• Γu ∩ Γv = ∅ ∈ R.
(c) For any Γu,Γv ∈ R,
• Γu \ Γv =
⊎
w∈Σ|v|−|u|\{x} Γuw if v = ux, i.e., u is a prefix of v, and
• Γu \ Γv = ∅ otherwise.
Therefore R is a semiring. By definition of R, we have σ(R) = Fω.
The function q : Σ∗ → [0, 1] naturally gives rise to a function µ : R → [0, 1]
with µ(∅) := 0 and µ(Γu) := q(u) for all u ∈ Σ∗. We will now check the
prerequisites of Carathe´odory’s Extension Theorem.
(a) (Normalization.) µ(Σω) = µ(Γǫ) = q(ǫ) = 1.
(b) (Finite additivity.) Let Γu1 , . . . ,Γuk ∈ R be pairwise disjoint sets such that
Γw :=
⊎k
i=1 Γui ∈ R. Let ℓ := max{|ui| | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, then Γw =
⊎
v∈Σℓ Γwv.
By assumption,
∑
a∈Σ q(ua) = q(u), thus
∑
a∈Σ µ(Γua) = µ(Γu) and induc-
tively we have
µ(Γui) =
∑
s∈Σℓ−|ui|
µ(Γuis), (4)
and
µ(Γw) =
∑
v∈Σℓ
µ(Γwv). (5)
For every string v ∈ Σℓ, the concatenation wv ∈ Γw =
⊎k
i=1 Γui , so there is
a unique i such that wv ∈ Γui . Hence there is a unique string s ∈ Σ
ℓ−|ui|
such that wv = uis. Together with (4) and (5) this yields
µ
(
k⊎
i=1
Γui
)
= µ(Γw) =
∑
v∈Σℓ
µ(Γwv) =
k∑
i=1
∑
s∈Σℓ−|ui|
µ(Γuis) =
k∑
i=1
µ(Γui).
(c) (σ-subadditivity.) We will show that each Γu is compact with respect to the
topology O generated by R. σ-subadditivity then follows from (b) because
every countable union is in fact a finite union.
We will show that the topology O is the product topology of the discrete
topology on Σ. (This establishes that (Σω,O) is a Cantor Space.) Ev-
ery projection πk : Σ
ω → Σ selecting the k-th symbol is continuous, since
π−1k (a) =
⋃
u∈Σk−1 Γua for every a ∈ Σ. Moreover, O is the coarsest topol-
ogy with this property, since we can generate every open set Γu ∈ R in the
base of the topology by
Γu =
|u|⋂
i=1
π−1i ({ui}).
The set Σ is finite and thus compact. By Tychonoff’s Theorem, Σω is also
compact. Therefore Γu is compact since it is homeomorphic to Σ
ω via the
canonical map βu : Σ
ω → Γu, v 7→ uv.
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From (a), (b), and (c) Carathe´odory’s Extension Theorem yields a unique prob-
ability measure Q on (Σω,Fω) such that Q(Γu) = µ(Γu) = q(u) for all
u ∈ Σ∗.
Using Lemma 19, the proof of Theorem 5 is now straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 5. We define a function q : Σ∗ → R, with
q(u) := X|u|(v)P (Γu)
for any v ∈ Γu. The choice of v is irrelevant because X|u| is constant on Γu since
it is Ft-measurable. In the following, we also write Xt(u) if |u| = t to simplify
notation.
The function q is non-negative because Xt and P are both non-negative.
Moreover, for any u ∈ Σt,
1 = E[Xt] =
∫
Σω
XtdP ≥
∫
Γu
XtdP = P (Γu)Xt(u) = q(u).
Hence the range of q is a subset of [0, 1].
We have q(ǫ) = X0(ǫ)P (Γǫ) = E[X0] = 1 since P is a probability measure
and F0 = {∅,Σω} is the trivial σ-algebra. Let u ∈ Σt.
∑
a∈Σ
q(ua) =
∑
a∈Σ
Xt+1(ua)P (Γua) =
∫
Γu
Xt+1dP
=
∫
Γu
E[Xt+1 | Ft]dP =
∫
Γu
XtdP = P (Γu)Xt(u) = q(u).
By Lemma 19, there is a probability measure Q on (Σω ,Fω) such that q(u) =
Q(Γu) of all u ∈ Σ∗. Therefore, for all v ∈ Σω and for all t ∈ N with P (Γv1:t) > 0,
Xt(v) =
q(v1:t)
P (Γv1:t)
=
Q(Γv1:t)
P (Γv1:t)
.
Moreover, Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P on cylinder sets since
P (Γu) = 0 implies
Q(Γu) = q(u) = X|u|(u)P (Γu) = 0.
A.3 Different Upcrossing inequalities and their tightness
There are different versions of the upcrossing inequality in circulation. Let a < b
and let (Xt)t∈N be a martingale process. Doob [Doo53, VII§3 Thm. 3.3] states
E[Ut(a, b)] ≤
1
b−aE[max{Xt − a, 0}]. (6)
Durrett [Dur10, Thm. 5.2.7] gives a slightly stronger version:
E[Ut(a, b)] ≤
1
b−a
(
E[max{Xt − a, 0}]− E[max{X0 − a, 0}]
)
. (7)
We will prove tight the version stated in Theorem 12 [Xu12, Thm. 1.1]:
E[Ut(a, b)] ≤
1
b−aE[max{a−Xt, 0}]. (8)
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For nonnegative martingales we can estimate E[max{a − Xt, 0}] ≤ a to get a
bound independent of t from the upcrossing inequality (8). To get a bound
independent of t from (6) or (7), we look at the upcrossings of the martingale
process (−Xt)t∈N, which are the downcrossings of (Xt)t∈N. The number of
downcrossings differs from the number of upcrossings by at most 1, so we can
conclude from (7),
E[UXt (a, b)] ≤ E[U
−X
t (−b,−a)] + 1
≤ 1b−a
(
E[max{a−Xt, 0}]− E[max{a−X0, 0}]
)
+ 1.
The origin of the diversity in upcrossing inequalities stems from the details of
their proofs. When we start betting every time the process (Xt)t∈N falls below a
and stop every time it rises above b, our gain at time t is at least (b− a)Ut(a, b)
plus some amount R that we gained or lost since we started betting last time
in case the last upcrossing has not yet completed. Because we are betting
on a martingale, our expected gain is zero, hence (b − a)E[Ut(a, b)] = E[−R].
The right hand sides of the equations (6), (7), and (8) arise from the way we
estimate R from below. The inequality (8) estimates R by taking into account
any possible losses ignoring gains since we last started betting at a. Contrarily,
(6) estimates R by taking into account any possible gains ignoring losses since
we started betting at a. In (7) we additionally suppose that we are betting
starting at time 0 and take into account any losses before Xt falls below a for
the first time.
Lemma 22 (Tightness Criterion for (8)). Let a < b and let (Xt)t∈N be a mar-
tingale such that
(a) Xt does not assume any values between a and b, and
(b) all upcrossings are completed at b and all downcrossings are completed at a:
XT2k = b and XT2k+1 = a ∀k ∈ N.
Then the inequality (8) is tight, i.e.,
E[Ut(a, b)] =
1
b−aE[max{a−Xt, 0}].
Proof. This proof essentially follows the proof of Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality
given in [Xu12]. Define the process
Dt(v) :=
∞∑
k=1
(
Xmin{t,T2k}(v)−Xmin{t,T2k−1}(v)
)
.
Since all but finitely many terms in the infinite sum are zero, Dt is well-defined.
The process (Dt)t∈N is martingale:
E[Dt+1 | Ft] =
∞∑
k=1
(
E[Xmin{t+1,T2k} | Ft]− E[Xmin{t+1,T2k−1} | Ft]
)
.
Fix some i ∈ N. Conditioning on Ft, we know whether Ti > t or Ti ≤ t since Ti
is a stopping time. In case Ti > t we have t+ 1 ≤ Ti, implying Xmin{t+1,Ti} =
Xt+1 and thus E[Xmin{t+1,Ti} | Ft] = E[Xt+1 | Ft] = Xt = Xmin{t,Ti} because
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(Xt)t∈N is martingale. In case Ti ≤ t we have Xmin{t+1,Ti} = XTi and hence
E[Xmin{t+1,Ti} | Ft] = E[XTi | Ft] = XTi = Xmin{t,Ti}. In both cases we get
E[Xmin{t+1,Ti} | Ft] = Xmin{t,Ti}, therefore E[Dt+1 | Ft] = Dt.
Let t ∈ N be some time step, and fix v ∈ Σω. Let Ut := Ut(a, b) denote the
number of upcrossings that have been completed up to time t. We distinguish
the following two cases.
(i) There is an incomplete upcrossing, T2Ut+1 ≤ t < T2Ut+2.
(ii) There is no incomplete upcrossing, T2Ut ≤ t < T2Ut+1.
In case (i) we have Xt < b and therefore Xt ≤ a by assumption (a). With
assumption (b) we get
Dt =
Ut∑
k=1
(XT2k −XT2k−1) +Xt −XT2Ut+1
=
Ut∑
k=1
(b− a) +Xt − a = (b− a)Ut +Xt − a.
(9)
In case (ii) we have Xt > a. With assumption (b) we get
Dt =
Ut∑
k=1
(XT2k −XT2k−1) =
Ut∑
k=1
(b− a) = (b− a)Ut. (10)
From (9) and (10) follows that
Dt = (b− a)Ut +min{Xt − a, 0}.
We have D0 = 0 and since (Dt)t∈N is martingale it follows that E[Dt] = 0.
Hence
(b− a)E[Ut] = E[−min{Xt − a, 0}] = E[max{a−Xt, 0}].
Theorem 23 (Tightness of Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality). Let P be a proba-
bility measure with perpetual entropy. For all b > a > 0 there is a nonnegative
martingale (Xt)t∈N with X0 = a that makes Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality tight
for all t > 0:
0 < E[UXt (a, b)] =
1
b−aE[max{a−Xt, 0}].
We added the requirement E[UXt (a, b)] > 0, because otherwise the constant
process Xt = a would trivially make the inequality tight.
Proof. Fix c := (a + b)/2 and set f(t) := (b − a)/(b + a) = (b − a)/(2c); then
f(t) < 1 because a > 0. Define X0 := X1 := a/c. The function f is not
summable, but we nonetheless apply the same construction as in Theorem 6:
for t > 1 let Xt be defined as in the proof of Theorem 6. We prove that the
scaled process Yt := c · Xt makes the inequality (8) tight. Since (Xt)t∈N does
upcrossings between 1 − f(Mt) = a/c and 1 + f(Mt) = b/c, the scaled process
(Yt)t∈N does upcrossings between a and b.
By Claim 1 (Xt)t∈N is a martingale process, and by Claim 5 Xt ≥ 0, hence
this also applies to the scaled process (Yt)t∈N. We check the criterion given in
Lemma 22.
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(a) This holds for Xt for t = 0 and t = 1 according to the definition of (Xt)t∈N.
For t > 1 this follows from Claim 6 since T1 = 1 because X1 = a/c.
(b) From Claim 4, this is fulfilled in cases (i) and (ii). In case (iii) we have
Xt+1 ≤ 1− f(Mt), so the process cannot do an (up-)crossing.
It remains to show that E[UYt (a, b)] > 0. By Claim 2 X0 > γ0, so for all
v ∈ Σω with v0 = aǫ we have X1 = 1 + f(Mt), therefore U
X
1 (a/c, b/c)(v) ≥ 1.
Since P (Γaǫ) > 0 by assumption, this yields E[U
X
1 (a/c, b/c)] > 0 and hence
E[UYt (a, b)] > 0 for all t > 1.
The process from Theorem 23 also gives a tightness result as t → ∞. A
weaker lower bound E[UX(a, b)] ≥ a+b8(b−a) −
1
2 can be derived directly from
Corollary 7 using δ := 1/2 and
f(i) :=
{
b−a
b+a , if i ≤
b+a
4(b−a) ,
0, otherwise,
and scaling the process with (b+ a)/2.
Corollary 24 (Asymptotic tightness of Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality). Let P
be a probability measure with perpetual entropy. For all b > a > 0 there is a
nonnegative martingale (Xt)t∈N with X0 = a such that
E[UX(a, b)] = ab−a .
Proof. Consider the process (Yt)t∈N from the proof of Theorem 23. Since
(Xt)t∈N is a nonnegative martingale, the Martingale Convergence Theo-
rem [Dur10, Thm. 5.2.8] implies that (Xt)t∈N converges almost surely to a limit
Xω ≥ 0. This limit can only be 0 or 1 by Claim 8. Since f(t) = (b−a)/(2c) > 0
for all t, (Xt)t∈N does not converge to 1 by Claim 6 (T1 = 1 by construction).
Thus Xω = 0 almost surely, but this generally does not imply limt→∞ E[Xt] =
0 [Dur10, Ex. 5.2.3]. However, max{a − Yt, 0} = max{a− cXt, 0} is bounded,
therefore uniformly integrable. By [Dur10, Thm. 5.5.2] (a generalization of the
dominated convergence theorem),
lim
t→∞
E[max{a− Yt, 0}] = E[max{a− cXω, 0}] = a. (11)
By Dubins’ Inequality,
E[UYt (a, b) · 1UYt (a,b)≥k] =
∞∑
i=k
P [UYt (a, b) ≥ i] ≤
∞∑
i=k
aib−i
= akb−k bb−a → 0 as k →∞,
hence UYt (a, b) is also uniformly integrable and by the same theorem [Dur10,
Thm. 5.5.2] and (11),
(b− a)E[UY (a, b)] = lim
t→∞
(b− a)E[UYt (a, b)] = lim
t→∞
E[max{a− Yt, 0}] = a.
The same process can also be used to show that Dubins’ Inequality is tight.
For a specific underlying probability measure a proof of this is sketched by
Dubins [Dub62, Thm. 12.1]. We prove a version that is agnostic with respect
to the probability measure P .
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Corollary 25 (Tightness of Dubins’ Inequality). Let P be a probability measure
with perpetual entropy. For all b > a > 0 there is a nonnegative martingale
(Xt)t∈N with X0 = a that makes Dubins’ Inequality tight:
P [UX(a, b) ≥ k] =
ak
bk
Proof. We use Dubins’ Inequality on the process (Xt)t∈N from Corollary 24;
E[UX(a, b)] =
∞∑
k=1
P [UX(a, b) ≥ k] ≤
∞∑
k=1
ak
bk
=
a
b− a
= E[UX(a, b)],
so the involved inequalities must in fact be equalities.
A.4 Davis’ Lemma
We do not reproduce Davis’ proof in detail. It needs to be adapted to the
martingale setting, which is quite cumbersome to do. Below we give an outline
of the proof.
Proof sketch for Lemma 14. This proof relies on the observation that the prob-
ability that Xt rises (falls) by at least α does not decrease as α decreases. For-
mally, we argued in the proof of Theorem 9 that P (XT ≥ x+α | Xt = x) ≤
x
x+α
using the Optional Stopping Theorem. Since (Xt)t∈N is bounded by 1 from
above, the same argument can be carried out for the process (1−Xt)t∈N, giving
an analogous bound P (XT ≤ x−α | Xt = x) ≤
1−x
1−x+α when (Xt)t∈N decreases.
These bounds are tight.
The idea of the proof is to define a martingale process (Zt)t∈N; the process
defined by Yt := Xt + Zt is then a martingale. We need to show that (Yt)t∈N
has the desired properties: 0 ≤ Yt ≤ 1 and the probability of having at least 2k
2α-alternations of (Xt)t∈N does not exceed the probability of having at least k
α-upcrossings of (Yt)t∈N.
There are two sources of misalignment between 2ε-alternations and ε-
upcrossings; we consider them in turn.
First, drift: if the martingale (Xt)t∈N overshoots the target and becomes
larger than XT ′
2k+1
+ α or smaller than XT ′
2k
− α, it changes the target in
subsequent alternations. Without loss of generality, consider the first case.
Suppose we are in time step t, have observed u ∈ Σt and 2k + 1 alterna-
tions have been completed, i.e., T ′2k+1 ≤ t < T
′
2k+2. By observing a symbol
a ∈ Σ, we would have Xt+1(ua) ≥ XT ′
2k+1
(u) + α with a possible overshoot
γ := Xt+1(ua) − (XT ′
2k+1
+ α). To compensate, we set Zt+1(ua) = Zt(u) − γ
and Zt+1(ub) ≥ Zt appropriately for b ∈ Σ\{a} such that Zt fulfills the martin-
gale condition (b) of Definition 2. Removing the overshoots from the martingale
makes upcrossings and alternations coincide, i.e. AYt (α) = 2U
Y
t (c−α/2, c+α/2)
for a suitable constant c, which we will discuss below. According to the afore-
mentioned observation, the new martingale is at least as likely to complete the
alternation as the old one, since we have reduced the distance needed to be
traveled.
Second, the initial value Y0. Let c ∈ (α/2, 1−α/2) and define Z0 := c+α/2−
X0. The constant c denotes the center of the alternations, i.e., Yn alternates
between c−α/2 and c+α/2, since Y0 = X0+Z0 = c+α/2. What value should we
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assign to c? Since we only care about cases where the number of alternations
is even, c = 1/2 maximizes the probability of successful upcrossings [Dav13,
Lem. 7]. This intuitively makes sense: there is an equal number of up- and
downcrossings and the probability of each of them being successful depends on
the process’ distance from 0 or 1 respectively.
At this point we have a martingale process (Yt)t∈N that is bounded between 0
and 1, and upcrossings and alternations coincide: AYt (α) = 2U
Y
t (
1−α
2 ,
1+α
2 ). It
remains to show that the probability of at least k alternations has not decreased
compared to the process (Xt)t∈N. By construction, this is already to case for
single down- and upcrossings. However, there could be cases where the drift that
we removed from the process would cause us to move to a region where successful
alternations are more likely. But since we centered the process optimally, this
is not possible.
There is one other technical problem that we glossed over: we have to make
sure that the process (Yt)t∈N exceeds neither 0 nor 1; We have to stop the
process at these points. Moreover, if the process Yt reaches 1 + Zt or Zt but
its value is in (0, 1) instead of stopping it, we switch to a random walk until we
‘get back on track’. ♦
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